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APPLICABILITY OF THE FLORIDA GUEST STATUTE
TO CAR POOL ARRANGEMENTS
One by-product of Florida's trend toward increased industrialization will probably be a more frequent use of "car pool" or "share-aride" arrangements. A corresponding increase in personal injury
suits instituted by members of car pools against the drivers is probable. This note will consider the applicability of Florida's guest statute to such arrangements and the degree of negligence required to
sustain personal injury actions by car pool members.
THE GUEST STATUTE

As a general rule the operator of an automobile must exercise
ordinary, reasonable care for the safety of his passengers.' Failure
to do so renders the driver liable for any injuries sustained by the
2
passenger, provided the passenger is not contributorily negligent.
Florida modified this general rule by the adoption, in 1937, of the
automobile guest statute. 3 The statute provides in part:
"No person transported by the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle as his guest or passenger, without payment for
such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages
against such owner or operator for injury . . . in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or
operator of such motor vehicle .... "
The owner or operator is thus relieved of liability to his guest passengers for ordinary negligence.
Although the Florida Supreme Court has held that the guest
statute is to be strictly construed 4 the modern tendency is toward a
more liberal interpretation in favor of the guest. This was exemplified by a recent case in which the Court stated that "a guest under
the statute . . . may recover for gross negligence which is that kind
or degree of negligence which lies in the area between ordinary negli...
-.- Since willful and
gence and wilful and wanton misconduct
wanton misconduct had formerly been considered synonymous with
gross negligence,6 it appears that the Florida Court has relaxed its
1. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §397 (1949).
2.
3.

1 SC-vARTz, TRIAL OF AUToMoBILE ACCIDENT CASES §502
(1959).

(1941).

FLA. STAT. §320.59

Berne v. Peterson, 113 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. 1959).
Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 22 (Fla. 1959). (Emphasis supplied.)
E.g., Brown v. Roach, 67 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1953); Dexter v. Green, 55 So. 2d
548 (Fla. 1951); Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So. 2d 870 (1946).
4.
5.
6.
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position as to the degree of negligence necessary for recovery under
the statute.
Payment by the Passenger
Section 320.59 of the Florida statutes defines a guest as one who
is transported without payment. Therefore, when the rider compensates the operator of the automobile, he does not come within
the purview of the statute.7 By the weight of authority in the United
States, such compensation need not be in the form of money.8 The
Kansas Supreme Court has indicated that payment sufficient to preclude classification as a guest may consist of some substantial benefit
conferred on the automobile owner or operator.0 It is apparently
sufficient if the passenger's presence directly compensates the driver
in a "material or business sense as distinguished from mere social
benefit or nominal or incidental contribution to expenses of the
trip."'', It should also be noted that the arrangement for compensation need not constitute a legal contractual obligation whereby the
driver could recover for the agreed or reasonable value of the transportation." Payment "is not to be considered in its restricted legal
sense as the discharge in money of a sum due or the performance of
' 2
a pecuniary obligation. "1
The Mutual Benefit Theoy
The Florida Supreme Court has adopted the "mutual benefit"
theory. In Peeqy v. Mershon the Court stated that "if his [the passenger's] carriage tends to the promotion of mutual interests of both
himself and the driver and operates for their common benefit, . . . he
is not a guest within the meaning of such enactments."' 3 The Court
did not speak in terms of payment of money but referred to promotion of mutual interests and common benefit. By using this general
terminology the Court provided latitude for determination of each
case according to its individual facts and the relationships of the
parties. The Florida Supreme Court's position that the guest statute
does not apply when the transportation is solely for the benefit of
7. Cormier v. Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 4 So. 2d 525 (1941).
8. 5 AM. JUR., Automobiles §239 (1936).
9. Sparks v. Getz, 170 Kan. 287, 225 P.2d 106 (1950).
10. Allison v. Ely, 170 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. 1960); see Burrow v. Porterfield,
171 Ohio St. 28, 168 N.E.2d 137 (1960), for a listing of the relationships in which
the rider is a guest and those in which he is a passenger.
11. Johnson v. Kolovos, 355 P.2d 1115 (Ore. 1960).
12. Id. at 1117.
13. 149 Fla. 351, 359, 5 So. 2d 694, 697 (1942).
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the driver, or for the mutual benefit of the occupant and the driver,
has been reiterated in four recent cases."
In Peeiy v. Mershon the defendant's servant was injured while
riding in an automobile driven by the defendant's wife. Although
this case concerned a master-servant relationship, the Florida Supreme Court in Handsel v. Handsel stated that "the doctrine of the
Mershon case is being extended to other than a master and servant
relationship."15
The benefit conferred on the driver as inducement for the transportation must be real and tangible,G but it need not accrue to the
driver at the actual time of transportation;" and it may be merely
an anticipated or prospective profit.' 8 If it is determined that the
motivating purpose of the transportation is companionship, pleasure,
social amenities, hospitality, or the like, the Court will apply the
guest statute. 8 The Florida Supreme Court has taken the position
that the mere sharing of expenses is not sufficient to avoid the
operation of the guest statute. 20 In Yokom v. Rodriguez21 the pas
senger was classified as a guest even though she had paid all of the
expenses of the trip, and she was denied recovery in absence of a
showing of gross negligence. The theory expressed in McDougald
v. Couey was that a contribution towards expenses "was but the gesture of a person who did not wish to impose upon his companion's
generosity . . ."22 The passenger, it was held, was under no obligation to pay, since payment was merely an afterthought.
These cases are clearly distinguishable from car pool or share-aride arrangements, for a car pool member "contributes" by furnishing
reciprocal transportation on an impersonal business level, not as a
personal gesture of appreciation.
CAR POOLS

There have been no cases decided under the Florida guest statute
with respect to car pool arrangements, but the question has been
dealt with in many other jurisdictions. The weight of authority
14. Berne v. Peterson, 113 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1959); Montana v. Gorp, 108 So.
2d 64 (Fla. 1959); Sproule v. Nelson, 81 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1955); Tillman v. McLeod,
124 So. 2d 135 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
15. 72 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1954).
16. Sullivan v. Stock, 98 So. 2d 507 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
17. Woodland v. Smith, 354 P.2d 391 (Wash. 1960).
18. Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955);
Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal. App. 2d 466, 265 P.2d 183 (1954).
19. Berne v. Peterson, 113 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1959).
20. McDougald v. Couey, 150 Fla. 748, 9 So. 2d 187 (1942).
21. 41 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1949).
22. 150 Fla. 748, 752, 9 So. 2d 187, 189 (1942).
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appears to be that when individuals alternate in transporting each
other to work without charging one another, the transportation is
not given gratuitously and the passenger is not considered to be a
guest.2 3 The basis for this conclusion is that each ride is paid for by

reciprocal transportation. It has been held that such relationships
are not social, that their sole purpose is the provision of convenient
transportation for the car pool members, 24 and that they are clearly
impersonal relationships "based upon business expedience and mutual
benefit."

2

5

A mutual agreement entered into by parents of school children
whereby the parents take turns driving the children to school should
logically be classified as a type of car pool arrangement. In a recent
Ohio case 20 it was held that a child riding with a driver other than
his parent under a reciprocal ride arrangement was a "paying passenger" rather than a guest. The court stated that a definite business
relationship existed in which the parents saved both time and expense. It should be noted that the Florida guest statute expressly
excludes children being transported to and from school.
APPLICATION AND EFFECT OF JOINT ENTERPRISE

Most jurisdictions appear to hold that guest statutes do not apply
when driver and passenger are engaged in a joint enterprise or adventure.2 7 The Florida Supreme Court indicated its approval of this
view in Yokom v. Rodriguez. It is questionable, however, whether
the Court will classify a car pool arrangement as a joint enterprise.
The essential elements of a joint enterprise were outlined in Yokom
and in Roberts v. Braynon.2 8 In the former case the Court stated
that (1) there must be an agreement, express or implied, to enter
into an undertaking; (2) there must be a community of interest in
the objects and purposes to be accomplished; and (3) the parties
must have equal authority in pursuance of the enterprise. A car pool
arrangement seems to comply with the first two elements, but the
23. E.g., Riggs v. Roberts, 74 Idaho 473, 264 P.2d 698 (1953); Collins v.
Rydman, 344 Mich. 588, 74 N.V.2d 900 (1956); Coerver v. Haab, 23 Wash. 2d 481,
161 P.2d 194 (1945).
24. Kinney v. Kraml Dairy, Inc., 20 111. App. 2d 531, 156 N.E.2d 623 (1959).
25. Bridges v. Lintz, 140 Colo. 582, 584, 346 P.2d 571, 572 (1959). Contra,
Everett v. Burg, 301 Mich. 734, 4 N.W.2d 63 (1942), in which it was held that
a typical car pool arrangement constituted the exchange of amenities between
fellow employees so as to establish a host and guest relationship.
26. Lisner v. Faust, 168 Ohio St. 346, 155 N.E.2d 59 (1958).
27. E.g., Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal. 2d 428, 122 P.2d 47 (1942); Brody v.
Harris, 308 Mich. 234, 13 N.V.2d 273 (1944); Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio
St. 185, 39 N.E.2d 140 (1942).
28. 90 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1956).
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